The Afghan Theater - Regional giants in play

The Afghan Theater - Regional giants in play

The hasty retreat of US-led Western forces and the ensuing second ascension of the Afghan Taliban were a marquee event of 2021, and ramifications continue to be felt even today. This has set Afghanistan, which has once again become a geopolitical hotspot, for new Great Game politics. In this context, major regional countries like China, Russia, India and Pakistan are pursuing cautious security-focused policies towards the Taliban-led Afghanistan.


Owing to its geostrategic location at the crossroads between Central Asia, the Middle East and South Asia, Afghanistan has great significance for the world's major powers. It is rich in natural resources like gas, oil, minerals, precious metals and rare earth elements. However, years of war have ravaged the country.

The chaotic withdrawal of US-backed Western forces in 2021, combined with the unfulfilment of the Doha Peace Accord and the ensuing shambolic Taliban government, has provided an environment conducive for the militants and extremist groups to operate on Afghan soil, posing a huge security threat to the whole region. Similarly, the Afghan Taliban, who are transitioning from an insurgent group to a governing entity, have been consolidating their power and are in search of international legitimacy. In such a scenario, Afghanistan has again become a focal point for major regional powers, like Russia, China, India and Pakistan. These countries have adopted their own peculiar policies towards Afghanistan, shaped by their competing interests, regional dynamics and global strategies.

1. Russia's open-door policy and influence maximization

Afghanistan has always remained important for Russia. It even invaded the country in 1979 to bring it into its sphere of influence. After ten years of chaotic presence, it ultimately departed in 1989. Later, during the first rule of the Taliban from 1996 to 2001, Russia's Afghan policy was shaped by its concerns about regional security, terrorism and global influence. It supported the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban faction. After 9/11, Russia, along with the international community, diplomatically isolated the Afghan Taliban and banned it as a terrorist outfit in 2003.

However, of late, Russia brought a paradigm shift in its policies towards the Afghan Taliban.

In 2021, the Russian ambassador to Kabul, Dmitry Zhirnov, met with the Taliban representatives within 48 hours after their takeover, becoming the first foreign diplomat to do so. This shows the scale of Afghanistan's significance for Russia. In this backdrop, Russia, on July 3, 2025, recognized the Taliban as a legitimate state power, becoming the first country to do so.

Many factors have framed this policy shift. Russia wants to counterbalance the US's influence in the region and fill the power vacuum left by the US withdrawal. Moreover, it is strengthening its anti-West alliance by bringing the Afghan Taliban, including other regional players, to its sphere of influence, building its own pole in a highly evolving multipolar world. It also wants to secure itself from the threat of various terror groups active in Afghanistan, like IS-K, another anti-Taliban group. Then, there is also an economic factor, as Afghanistan provides a transit route for Russian exports to South and Southeast Asia. Apart from this, mining, agriculture, transportation and energy sectors of Afghanistan are attracting huge Russian attention. Succinctly, Russia adopts an open-door policy towards Afghanistan.

2. China's economic pragmatism with security hedging

China is linked to Afghanistan through the narrow strip of the Wakhan Corridor. It was the first country to appoint its ambassador to Kabul – in 2023 – since the Taliban takeover, though it has not yet formally recognized the Taliban government. China's policy towards Afghanistan is pragmatic and non-interventionist, centered on economic cooperation and security interests. Many factors drive China's Afghan policy. In the economic realm, China is investing in mineral, coal, oil and gas exploration in Afghanistan. It also wants to integrate the country into the BRI through CPEC to enhance its access to Central Asian and Middle Eastern markets.

China's Afghan policy is also security-centric. It wants to secure its Xinjiang province, which borders Afghanistan, from the infiltration of terrorist groups like the East Turkistan Islamic Movement. This group has maintained an active presence in Afghanistan, especially after the US withdrawal, and wants to establish an independent East Turkistan in China.

3. India's development-oriented engagement and strategic balancing

Since 2021, India has maintained a technical mission there to ensure its diplomatic presence. However, this mission was upgraded to a full-fledged embassy in late 2025 with a view to deepening diplomatic ties with the Afghan administration, though it has not yet formally recognized the Taliban government.

As Pakistan and Afghanistan have a chequered history of bilateral relations, India, an arch-foe of Pakistan, has adopted a well-calculated and nuanced approach towards Afghanistan. During the first tenure of the Afghan Taliban – India considered them the protégés of Pakistan at that time – India's policy was one of avoidance, and it even supported, like Russia, the Northern Alliance. After 9/11, India supported the US-backed so-called democratic Afghan government. However, a paradigm shift in India's Afghan policy has been noted in recent weeks, which is primarily driven by the acrimonious Pak-Afghan relations.

Apart from countering Pakistan's influence in the region, other key aspects of India's Afghan policy are economic and security-related. India has made considerable investments in the agriculture, minerals and energy sectors. It is also seeking to enhance connectivity with Afghanistan through Chabahar Port in Iran. On security front, India wants the Afghan Taliban to act against the al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), a regional franchise of Al-Qaeda active in South Asia, including India.

4. Pakistan's carrot-and-stick policy

Until now, Pakistan has seen Afghanistan through the lens of 'strategic depth'. It supported the Afghan Jihad against the former Soviet Union and also supported the Taliban during their first term in Kabul. However, the second coming of the Taliban changed the dynamics. Insurgency has increased in Pakistan for which it accuses the Taliban of harbouring anti-Pakistan terror groups, like TTP, BLA and IS-K, which are active there.

In such a scenario, Pakistan's Afghan policy is shaped by security, countering Indian influence and having economic leverage. Of late, it has adopted a carrot-and-stick approach, combining coercive actions with diplomatic engagement. Pakistan has closed its border with Afghanistan for any trade, and has already repatriated millions of Afghan refugees to pressure the Taliban into expelling TTP from Afghan soil. Both countries have also engaged in border skirmishes, although Pakistan seeks to have a friendly government in Kabul to counter Indian influence there.

Conclusion

In this age of realpolitik, regional powers have great stakes in Afghanistan, which has always remained a regional chessboard. Russia, China, India and Pakistan, the major regional powers, have adopted their own peculiar policies towards the Taliban-governed Afghanistan. Being infamous as a geopolitical trap, Afghanistan is luring, as always, for these four regional giants. Each of them is vigorously playing in the Afghan theater to further their own national interests. However, they should carefully devise their policies towards Afghanistan, as an unstable Afghanistan can have catastrophic effects for the region. The challenges in Afghanistan can not be solved only through unilateral engagement. In this regard, a holistic and coordinated approach is required from the international community, including the regional powers.

The writer is currently serving as an educator in the KP government.

Email: faridullah165@gmail.com

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The writer is currently serving as an educator in the KP government.