Rare Earths, Great Power Politics

Rare earth elements (REEs) are not a single mineral, but a family of 17 metallic elements, the 15 lanthanides plus scandium and yttrium. These are “relatively abundant” yet difficult to extract and refine economically because they occur in low concentrations and require complex separation chemistry. Their importance is disproportionate to their volume: tiny quantities enable the high-performance components that power the modern economy and, increasingly, modern warfare.

REEs are indispensable in permanent magnets, especially neodymium-based magnets used in electric motors and generators. These magnets sit inside electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, consumer electronics, industrial motors and data centres. Beyond the green economy, rare earth magnets are also embedded in defence supply chains. The US Department of Defense has publicly framed a “mine-to-magnet” priority, emphasizing assured access to REEs needed for permanent magnets used in key US weapons systems. The same category of magnets appears in platforms such as the F-35 and a wide range of unmanned and advanced defence systems (the precise mix is classified, but the dependence is repeatedly acknowledged in official US industrial-based communications). This is why REEs show up in US national “critical minerals” strategies: a disruption is not just an inconvenience for manufacturers; it can become a national security vulnerability.

The global market fragility is rooted in concentration downstream. Reuters, citing consultancy AlixPartners, has reported estimates that China controls up to 70% of global rare-earth mining, 85% of refining capacity and 90% of rare-earth metal alloy and magnet production. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has underlined how this dominance translates into trade leverage: in 2024, China exported about 58,000 tons of rare earth magnets, enough for millions of cars or vast volumes of industrial and strategic equipment.